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INTRODUCTION
In the year 1978, the 1976 Copyright Act had just entered into effect.
Marshall Leaffer, whom this article will affectionately refer to by his first
name, had just completed his duties as an attorney advisor at the U.S.
Copyright Office. On his way to academia, he, like the fictional character
Captain William “Buck” Rogers,1 was to experience cosmic forces beyond
all comprehension. In a freak mishap, his car veered off a rarely used
mountain road and was frozen by temperatures beyond imagination. He did
not return to academia until more than forty years later. What will he
discover upon his return? Will he find the developments in the intervening
decades interesting or surprising? What observations would he make had he
not been frozen in 1978?
Answering these questions is the charge of this tribute. Because of
Marshall’s love for copyright law, his many important contributions to the
international intellectual property field, and his longtime membership in the
Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale2 (ALAI), this Article pays
tribute by examining the past four decades of developments surrounding the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works3 (“Berne
Convention”). Parts I to III focus on three areas that are usually explored in
relation to the Convention’s revision process: (1) the arrival of new members;
(2) the advent of new technologies; and (3) the introduction of new rights and

1

This imaginary scenario was chosen for three reasons. First, the protection of fictional
characters is a staple in copyright law. See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING
COPYRIGHT LAW 88–90 (7th ed. 2019) (discussing such protection); Marshall Leaffer,
Character Merchandising in the U.K., a Nostalgic Look, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L.
REV. 453 (1994) (analyzing the comparative legal issues involving character merchandising).
Second, BUCK ROGERS IN THE 25TH CENTURY (Universal Pictures 1979), followed by a twoseason television show, was released in the first year of Marshall’s teaching career. Finally,
and on a more personal level, Marshall’s Understanding Copyright Law and his article on
character merchandising were some of the first works of his that I encountered when I wrote
my student note. Peter K. Yu, Note, Fictional Persona Test: Copyright Preemption in Human
Audiovisual Characters, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 355 (1998).
2
Founded in 1878 by French novelist Victor Hugo as the International Literary Association,
this association played crucial roles in the founding of the Berne Convention. See Sam
Ricketson, The Birth of the Berne Union, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 9, 19–22 (1986);
Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime,
38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 337–38 (2004) [hereinafter Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents].
3
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 1161
U.N.T.S. 3 (revised at Paris July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
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limitations. Part IV concludes by examining the emergence of new external
influences.
I.

NEW MEMBERS

In our admittedly imaginary scenario, Marshall returned to academia
in 2021 after being frozen for more than four decades. The first thing he
would discover about the Berne Convention is likely the United States’
accession in November 1988, which became effective on March 1, 1989.4
Considering that the 1976 Copyright Act was partly drafted with this goal in
mind, and that Marshall was advising former Register of Copyrights Barbara
Ringer on the statute’s implementation before he was frozen, he would be
unlikely to find such accession surprising. In fact, he would be elated to learn
that the new statute that he helped implement had paved the way for the
United States’ accession a decade later.
By changing the duration of copyright protection from two terms of
twenty-eight years to the life of the author plus fifty years, 5 the 1976
Copyright Act has made “some progress . . . toward [the United States’] entry
into the Berne Convention.”6 The phasing out of the manufacturing clause,
which required the local production of “work[s] consisting preponderantly of
nondramatic literary material . . . in the English language,” 7 also helped
remove another key barrier.8 The Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988 finally addressed the remaining barriers9 by limiting the applicability of
the provisions on formalities to U.S. works 10 and thereby facilitating the

4

WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties > Berne Convention [Total Contracting
Parties:
181],
WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.,
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/treaties/ShowResults?search_what=C&treaty_id=15
(last
visited Mar. 28, 2022) [hereinafter Contracting Parties].
5
See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (stipulating the duration of copyright protection).
6
LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 12.
7
17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (repealed 2010). The manufacturing clause expired on July 1, 1986.
Marshall Leaffer, International Copyright from an American Perspective, 43 ARK. L. REV.
373, 398 (1990) [hereinafter Leaffer, International Copyright].
8
See Leaffer, International Copyright, supra note 7, at 398–402 (discussing the abrogation
and limited lingering effects of the manufacturing clause).
9
See LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 570 (“The most significant change to American copyright
law brought about by the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 amendments is the
abrogation of required notice for publicly distributed works on or after March 1, 1989.”).
10
See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has
been made in accordance with this title.”).
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conformity of U.S. copyright law with Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention,
which stipulated that “[t]he enjoyment and the exercise of [the covered] rights
shall not be subject to any formality.”11
One issue that has continued to bother other Berne members after the
United States’ accession concerns the limited protection of moral rights.12
Although Congress adopted the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 13 that
statute provides only limited protection to the rights of attribution and
integrity in the small category of visual art, which covers paintings, drawings,
prints, sculptures, and still photographic images.14 Such protection therefore
does not fully meet the requirements stated in Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention.15 Upon his return in our imaginary scenario, Marshall would be
likely to find these moral rights issues highly interesting. Indeed, had he not
been frozen at the time of the Berne accession, he would probably have
weighed in on the debate by noting the different protections for moral rights
in France and the United States.16
While the United States’ accession was one of the more notable
developments concerning new Berne members, two other members deserve
attention. China joined the Berne Convention on July 10, 1992, 17 after

11

Berne Convention, supra note 3, art. 5(2).
See ROBERTA KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR
THE UNITED STATES 37 (2009) (“[T]here is the stark reality that [the United States] may not
be in compliance with [its] obligations under the Berne Convention.”); Peter K. Yu, Moral
Rights 2.0, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 873, 875 (2014) (“Notwithstanding the United States’s
obligations under the Berne Convention and its role as a vocal global champion of
intellectual property rights, the country has yet to protect moral rights to the same extent as
its counterparts in continental Europe.”).
13
17 U.S.C. § 106A.
14
See id. § 101 (defining a “work of visual art”).
15
See Berne Convention, supra note 3, art. 6bis(1) (“Independently of the author’s economic
rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or
other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor
or reputation.”).
16
See LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 568 (noting that the Visual Artists Rights Act allows the
United States to “g[i]ve explicit, but hardly complete, recognition to a moral right”);
Marshall A. Leaffer, Of Moral Rights and Resale Royalties: The Kennedy Bill, 7 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 234 (1989) (examining whether the act, as proposed, would enhance the
protection of moral rights).
17
Contracting Parties, supra note 4.
12

5
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introducing a modern copyright statute in September 1990.18 Until then, the
People’s Republic of China did not have a copyright law. For decades, the
country offered Soviet-like protection to authors, with emphases on gaofei
(basic payment for writings and manuscripts) and jingshen quanli (the noneconomic rights of attribution and integrity).19
Since its accession to the Berne Convention, China has amended its
copyright law three times. The first amendment took place in October 2001,20
two months before China became the 143rd member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).21 This amendment brought Chinese copyright law into
conformity with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights 22 (“TRIPS Agreement”). The second, and more limited,

18

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa (中华人民共和国著作权法) [Copyright
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, effective June 1, 1991) [hereinafter 1990 Copyright Law].
19
See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 59 (1995) (“Chinese officials and scholars closely
studied the Soviet example, which at least in theory provided that authors were entitled to
fixed ‘basic payments’ for their work, based predominantly on the number of copies printed,
which the Chinese termed gaofei, and had the right to prevent unauthorized alteration of their
work.”); Peter K. Yu, The Long and Winding Road to Effective Copyright Protection in
China, 49 PEPP. L. REV. 681, 689 (2022) [hereinafter Yu, Long and Winding Road] (noting
that the copyright regulations introduced after the founding of the People’s Republic
“focused primarily on the basic payments for writings and manuscripts (gaochou or gaofei),
the noneconomic rights of attribution and integrity, and contracts between authors and state
organs” (footnotes omitted)); Zheng Chengsi, The Future Chinese Copyright System and Its
Context, 15 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 141, 144 (1984) (“[F]rom the very
beginning of the People’s Republic of China, the author has enjoyed the right to a
contribution fee in most cases, the right to publish (or not to publish) his work, the right to
publish under his own name or pseudonymously, or in some other way, and the right to
prevent distortion of his work in all cases.”).
20
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa (中华人民共和国著作权法) [Copyright
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective Nov. 1, 2001) [hereinafter 2001
Copyright Law].
21
China became the 143rd member of the WTO on December 11, 2001. China, WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_chine_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZL2L-Z3X6]; see also Peter K. Yu et al., China and the WTO: Progress,
Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2003) (discussing the ramifications of
China’s entry into the WTO).
22
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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amendment was adopted in February 2010, 23 primarily to implement the
WTO panel report in China—Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights.24 At issue in this dispute was
Article 4 of the 2001 Chinese Copyright Law, which denied copyright
protection to works that had been prohibited from publication or
dissemination.25 The WTO panel found the provision to be inconsistent with
China’s obligations under Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention as
incorporated by Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and under Article 41.1
of the TRIPS Agreement. 26 The third amendment was introduced more
recently in November 2020 amid the COVID-19 pandemic.27 Ushering in a
second complete overhaul of the Chinese copyright system, and the first since
the country’s WTO accession, the latest amendment entered into force in June
2021.28
Although China continues to struggle with problems concerning the
enforcement of copyright law29 and its heavy media regulation continues to

23

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa (中华人民共和国著作权法) [Copyright
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Feb. 26, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010).
24
Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter WTO Panel
Report].
25
2001 Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 4.
26
WTO Panel Report, supra note 24, ¶ 8.1(a); see also Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement
Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1075–81, 1096–1101 (2011) (discussing this claim); Peter
K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 727, 739–
43 (2011) (discussing this claim).
27
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa (中华人民共和国著作权法) [Copyright
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Nov. 11, 2020, effective June 1, 2021).
28
See generally Yu, Long and Winding Road, supra note 19 (discussing the major changes
in the 2020 amendment); Peter K. Yu, Third Amendment to the Chinese Copyright Law, 69
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. (forthcoming 2022) (discussing the major changes in the 2020
amendment).
29
For the Author’s earlier discussions of the piracy and counterfeiting problems in China,
see generally Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China
Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st ed. 2007);
Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the
Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners
(Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901
(2006).

7

IP THEORY

[Vol 12.001

affect the copyright industries, 30 what Marshall would see in the Chinese
copyright system upon his return would likely differ drastically from what he
saw when he was still working in the U.S. Copyright Office. At that time,
China was dealing with the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution (1966–
1976)31 and was about to reopen its economy to the outside world.32 Many of
the legal reforms, including the adoption of all modern intellectual property
laws, were not carried out until a decade later. The Trademark Law, the Patent
Law, and the Copyright Law were adopted in 1982, 1984, and 1990,
respectively.33
The final Berne member that deserves some attention is Russia, which
joined the Berne Convention on December 9, 1994.34 As former Register of
Copyrights Ralph Oman recounted, in a meeting he attended, the late Arpad
Bogsch, the former Director General of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), lumped Russia together with China and the United
States. 35 As Bogsch said publicly: “There they are, the three bad boys of
copyright—China, the United States, and the Soviet Union—all not members

30

For discussions of the regulation of media and audiovisual products in China, see generally
Mary L. Riley, The Regulation of the Media in China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
LAW AND PRACTICE 355 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999); Mary Lynne Calkins, Censorship
in Chinese Cinema, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 239 (1999); Peter K. Yu, Piracy,
Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China
Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L. L.J. 1, 28–32 (2001).
31
The Cultural Revolution was a period in which “scientists, engineers and members of the
intelligentsia were discredited, demoted or dismissed from their positions.” Peter K. Yu, The
Transplant and Transformation of Intellectual Property Laws in China, in GOVERNANCE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND EUROPE 20, 27–28 (Nari Lee et al. eds.,
2016). In these circumstances, most authors understandably declined to claim authorship or
demand material rewards.
32
See Peter K. Yu, A Half-Century of Scholarship on the Chinese Intellectual Property
System, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1045, 1058–59 (2018) (discussing China’s reopening to the
outside world following the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in
December 1978).
33
1990 Copyright Law, supra note 18; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa (中华人
民共和国专利法) [Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985); Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa (中华人民共和国商标法) [Trademark Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Aug. 23, 1982, effective Mar. 1, 1983).
34
Contracting Parties, supra note 4.
35
See Ralph Oman, Copyright Piracy in China, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 583,
583 (2006).
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of the Berne Convention sitting next to each other in the front row!”36 In the
context of new Berne members, it is therefore logical to discuss Russia
alongside the United States and China.
Thus far, Russia’s accession to the Berne Convention has had a rather
limited impact on international copyright developments.37 Nevertheless, the
accession generated an important choice-of-law case in U.S. copyright law,
which was noted in leading treatises and hornbooks in the field.38 Itar-Tass
Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc. involved the unauthorized
republication by a weekly Russian-language newspaper in New York of news
articles that Itar-Tass Russian News Agency and several Russian newspaper
publishers had originally published in Russia.39 Filed in April 1995, a month
after the Berne Convention took effect in Russia,40 the case was eventually
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.41
Itar-Tass, which continues to be taught in U.S. law schools, reminded
us that the Berne Convention is not self-executing in the United States.42
Section 4(a)(3) of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, which
was codified in section 104(c) of the U.S. Copyright Act, states explicitly the
following:
No right or interest in a work eligible for protection under this title may
be claimed by virtue of . . . the provisions of the Berne Convention . . . .
Any rights in a work eligible for protection under this title that derive
from this title . . . shall not be expanded or reduced by virtue of . . . the
provisions of the Berne Convention . . . .43

36

Id.
For discussions of Russian copyright law, see generally MICHIEL ELST, COPYRIGHT,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND CULTURAL POLICY IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (2005);
MICHAEL A. NEWCITY, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE SOVIET UNION (1978); Igor Pozhitkov,
Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection in the Russian Federation, 20 REV. CENT. &
E. EUR. L. 53 (1994); Corien Prins & Irina V. Savel’eva, Computer Program Copyright Law
in the Russian Federation: International Experience and Russian Reality, 19 REV. CENT. &
E. EUR. L. 31 (1993).
38
See LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 583 (discussing Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian
Kurier).
39
153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998).
40
The Berne Convention took effect in Russia on March 13, 1995. Contracting Parties,
supra note 4.
41
Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d 82.
42
Id. at 90.
43
17 U.S.C. § 104(c).
37
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The case also “illustrates the difference between national treatment and
choice of law rules.” 44 Noticing that the Convention has not provided a
choice-of-law rule for disputes involving foreign copyright holders, Judge
Jon Newman proceeded to “fill the interstices of the Act by developing
federal common law on the conflicts issue.”45 At the comparative level, the
case is also interesting because it has provided important lessons in three
areas in addition to the choice of applicable law: (1) the role of private
international law in resolving cross-border intellectual property disputes; (2)
the interplay of intellectual property and freedom of expression; and (3) the
impact of the global economy on international intellectual property norm
setting.46
Today, the Berne Convention has more than 180 members, including
the United States, China, and Russia.47 Many developing countries have also
joined the Convention after the establishment of the WTO and its TRIPS
Agreement.48 Indeed, the influx of these new Berne members has provided
an interesting contrast with the 1960s, when many developed countries were
concerned about the future of the Berne Convention in view of the emergence
of many newly independent countries as a result of decolonization. Before
the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm in June and July 1967, at
which the Berne Convention was revised and the Berne appendix took its
early shape,49 Register Ringer, Marshall’s former boss, noted the “fear that . . .

44

LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 583.
Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 90.
46
See generally Peter K. Yu, The Comparative Lessons of Itar-Tass Russian News Agency
v. Russian Kurier, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE 110 (Mira T. Sundara Rajan ed., 2019) (discussing these comparative
lessons).
47
Contracting Parties, supra note 4.
48
More than seventy countries acceded to the Berne Convention after the founding of the
WTO. Id. Virtually all of them were developing countries. Estonia, Lithuania, and South
Korea were the rare exceptions from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development.
49
Berne Convention, supra note 3, app.; see also SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND
BEYOND 960–63 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the incorporation of the Berne Appendix into the
TRIPS Agreement and the WIPO Copyright Treaty); Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two
Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465, 481–84 (2009) [hereinafter Yu,
Development Agendas] (discussing the Berne Appendix).
45
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Berne would become a moribund old gentlemen’s club.”50 Today, however,
there is no denying that the Berne Convention has become the predominant
international treaty in the copyright field. Few copyright law scholars still
discuss developments relating to the Universal Copyright Convention,51 a
middle-of-the-road treaty that the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted in September 1952 to ease the
United States and other Latin American countries into the international
copyright family.52 Even fewer mention those regional conventions to which
the United States remains a party, such as the Buenos Aires Convention.53
II.

NEW TECHNOLOGIES

Since its inception in the late nineteenth century, the Berne
Convention has evolved to keep pace with new technology. The 1908 Berlin
Act was introduced to update the Convention in light of photographic and
cinematographic technologies. 54 Article 3 states expressly that the
Convention “shall apply to photographic works and to works produced by a

50

Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright—Past,
Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1066 (1968); see also Eugene M. Braderman,
International Copyright—A World View, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 147, 153
(1970) (noting the “fear that there would be a mass exodus of developing countries from
Berne and into the [Universal Copyright Convention]”).
51
Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 25 U.S.T. 1341 (revised at Paris July 24,
1971); see also LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 563–65 (discussing the Convention); Ringer, supra
note 50, at 1060–69 (discussing the Convention); Jørgen Blomqvist, Universal Copyright
Convention—RIP, IPKAT (Dec. 22, 2021), https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/12/guestpost-universal-copyright.html [https://perma.cc/AVH6-UW5Q] (suggesting the demise of
the Universal Copyright Convention following the recent accession to the Berne Convention
by Cambodia, the only member of the former that has not joined the latter until then).
52
See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 2, at 342 (discussing the establishment of
the Convention); see also Peter Jaszi, A Garland of Reflections on Three International
Copyright Topics, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 53 (1989) (contending that the
Convention “had been designed as a sort of junior Berne Convention, with the specific
objective of bringing the United States and other recalcitrant nations into the fold”); Ringer,
supra note 50, at 1061 (describing the Convention as “a new ‘common denominator’
convention that was intended to establish a minimum level of international copyright
relations throughout the world, without weakening or supplanting the Berne Convention”).
53
Copyright Convention Between the United States and Other American Republics, Aug. 11,
1910, 38 Stat. 1785 (1910); see also LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 577 (discussing the Buenos
Aires Convention).
54
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 1
L.N.T.S. 217 (revised at Berlin Nov. 13, 1908) [hereinafter Berlin Act].
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process analogous to photography.”55 Article 14 extended protection to “the
exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction and public representation of
their works by cinematography.”56
Two decades later, the 1928 Rome Act included new provisions
covering the broadcasting of copyrighted works.57 Article 11bis(1) declares:
“Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of
authorizing the communication of their works to the public by radiodiffusion.”58 Yet another twenty years later, the 1948 Brussels Act extended
the coverage to situations involving “television broadcasts, retransmissions,
public communication of transmissions by such means as loudspeakers, and
the fixation of works after transmission.”59 Article 11bis(1)(i) specifically
mentioned the “wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or images.”60 The past
four decades generally followed these expansive directions, even though the
Berne Convention has not been revised since the 1971 Paris Act, the act that
the TRIPS Agreement has now incorporated by reference.61
Upon his return in our imaginary scenario, Marshall would be likely
to immediately notice that the United States and other Berne members had
gone through one of the biggest transformations in copyright history: the
digital revolution. 62 In the past three decades, legal commentators

Id. art. 3. The Final Protocol to the original Berne Convention did state that “those
countries of the Union where the character of artistic works [wa]s not refused to photographs
engage[d] to admit them to the benefits of the Convention.” Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, final protocol,
https://global.oup.com/booksites/content/9780198259466/15550015
[https://perma.cc/3EZU-N5FV] [hereinafter Original Text].
56
Berlin Act, supra note 54, art. 14.
57
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 123
L.N.T.S. 233 (revised at Rome June 2, 1928) [hereinafter Rome Act].
58
Id. art. 11bis(1).
59
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 49, at 117 (footnote omitted).
60
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 11bis(1)(i), Sept.
9, 1886, 331 U.N.T.S. 217, 231 (revised at Brussels June 26, 1948) [hereinafter Brussels
Act].
61
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 9.1 (stating that WTO members “shall comply
with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto”).
62
See Marshall Leaffer, Protecting Authors’ Rights in a Digital Age, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 1
(1995) [hereinafter Leaffer, Protecting Authors’ Rights] (discussing the voluntary aspects of
digital technology). See generally COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. RTS. & THE EMERGING INFO.
INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2000) (discussing the threat digital technology has
posed to the copyright system).
55
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documented the revolution’s tremendous impacts on the copyright system.63
For example, the internet and digital technologies have simultaneously
broken six different types of access barriers that have hitherto protected
copyright holders from the unauthorized exploitation of their works:
geographical, temporal, economic, linguistic, legal, and technological.64 The
widespread use of these technologies in private homes has also elided the
traditional distinction between what is public and what is private—and, by
extension, what is commercial and what is non-commercial.65 While the No
Electronic Theft Act extended criminal liability for copyright infringement to
individuals who have not made any monetary profit through their infringing
activities,66 file-sharing cases such as A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
stated that internet users could reap economic advantages from file-sharing
services by “get[ting] for free something they would ordinarily have to
buy.” 67 To enhance protection for authors in the digital environment, the
copyright system has also put in place new laws governing both technological
protection measures and rights management information.68
In addition, it remains difficult to determine whether the internetrelated technologies represent one form of technology or multiple forms.

63

Marshall is no exception. See, e.g., Marshall Leaffer, Internet 2.0: Une perspective
Américaine, in CONTREFAÇON SUR INTERNET: LES ENJEUX DU DROIT D’AUTEUR SUR LE WEB
2.0 (Institut de Recherche en Propriété Intellectuelle ed., 2009) (providing an American
perspective in a collection of articles on internet counterfeiting in the context of Web 2.0);
Marshall Leaffer, Domain Names, Globalization, and Internet Governance, 6 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 139 (1998) (identifying the problems concerning the domain name
system and calling for the development of a coordinated multilateral solution based on
national interests); Leaffer, Protecting Authors’ Rights, supra note 62 (delivering the
Doermann Distinguished Lecture on the difficulties the digital revolution has created for the
protection of the authors’ creative outputs).
64
See Peter K. Yu, A Seamless Global Digital Marketplace of Media and Entertainment
Content, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN MEDIA AND
ENTERTAINMENT 265, 266–76 (Megan Richardson & Sam Ricketson eds., 2017) (discussing
the internet’s impact on these access barriers).
65
See Peter K. Yu, Increased Copyright Flexibilities for User-Generated Creativity, in
REFORMING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 304, 308 (Gustavo Ghidini & Valeria Falce eds.,
2022) (discussing the gradual shift in U.S. copyright law from making a distinction between
commercial and non-commercial infringement to evaluating whether the unauthorized use
has provided a commercial advantage).
66
No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).
67
114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
68
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (offering protection against the circumvention of copyright
protection systems); id. § 1202 (safeguarding the integrity of copyright management
information).
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Since the mid-1990s, copyright law continues to address challenges brought
about by electronic communications, the internet, cloud computing, digital
streaming, and many other forms of digital technology. While many of these
issues are quite similar, they also bring new issues to the copyright debate.
For instance, even though cloud computing raises many of the same issues
explored in the cyberlaw literature in the 1990s, it sparks new questions
concerning the “replicat[ion of content] within the cloud for reasons of
performance, availability, backup, and redundancy.” 69 Because cloud
platforms tend to involve remote servers located abroad, distribution of
copyrighted works on these platforms will raise additional territorialityrelated questions concerning the applicable laws and their extraterritorial
application.70
Another type of new technology that will deeply affect the future
development of the copyright system is artificial intelligence—a very hot
topic in today’s copyright debate. 71 While WIPO has initiated a series of
conversations to explore the impact of artificial intelligence on intellectual
property policy,72 national governments have actively explored whether they
need to introduce updates 73 to accommodate what commentators have
referred to as the “Second Machine Age” or the “Fourth Industrial
Revolution.”74 At the time of writing, the laws governing the copyrightability

69

Ian Walden, Law Enforcement Access to Data in Clouds, in CLOUD COMPUTING LAW 285,
287 (Christopher Millard ed., 1st ed. 2013).
70
See Peter K. Yu, Towards the Seamless Global Distribution of Cloud Content, in PRIVACY
AND LEGAL ISSUES IN CLOUD COMPUTING 180, 186 (Anne S.Y. Cheung & Rolf H. Weber
eds., 2015) (“If the cloud platform involves remote servers located outside the country, such
distribution will raise two additional sets of territoriality questions: (1) What is the applicable
law? (2) Will such law be applied extraterritorially?”).
71
See Peter K. Yu, Can Algorithms Promote Fair Use?, 14 FIU L. REV. 329, 330 n.2 (2020)
(collecting the literature that discuss whether creative works generated by intelligent
machines are eligible for copyright protection).
72
The WIPO Conversation on Intellectual Property and Artificial Intelligence, WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/aboutip/en/artificial_intelligence/conversation.html [https://perma.cc/H7GZ-EEP3] (last visited
Mar. 23, 2022).
73
See, e.g., U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PUBLIC VIEWS ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY (2020) (collecting comments on the impact of
artificial intelligence on different areas of intellectual property policies, including copyrights,
patents, trademarks, database protections, and trade secret law).
74
See, e.g., ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK,
PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES (2014); Yann Ménière
& Ilja Rudyk, The Fourth Industrial Revolution from the European Patent Office Perspective,
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of works generated solely by computers or machines remain diverse. For
example, the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices states that the
U.S. Copyright Office “will not register works produced by a machine or
mere mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without
any creative input or intervention from a human author.” 75 By contrast,
copyright laws in Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom cover the
special category of computer-generated works. 76 Section 9(3) of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act declares: “In the case of a literary,
dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the author
shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the
creation of the work are undertaken.”77
Since the emergence of the debate at the intersection of intellectual
property and artificial intelligence, commentators have questioned whether
the legal system needs quick adjustments considering that works that involve
artificial intelligence today are created with the assistance of, but not
autonomously by, artificial intelligence. 78 As James Grimmelman noted

in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIGITAL TRADE IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AND BIG DATA 29, 33 (Xavier Seuba et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter IP AND DIGITAL TRADE].
75
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 313.2 (3d
ed. 2021).
76
See, e.g., Copyright Act 1994, s 5(2)(a) (N.Z.) (stipulating that “in the case of a literary,
dramatic, musical, or artistic work that is computer-generated, the person by whom the
arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken”); Copyright and Related
Rights
Act
2000
(Act.
No.
28/2000)
§
21(f)
(Ir.),
https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2000/act/28/enacted/en/html [https://perma.cc/DQK3CBBS] (stipulating that “in the case of a work which is computer-generated, the person by
whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken”); Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 9(3) (U.K.) (“In the case of a literary, dramatic,
musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the author shall be taken to be the
person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.”).
77
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 9(3) (U.K.).
78
As WIPO defined in an issue paper:
“AI-generated” and “generated autonomously by AI” are terms that are
used interchangeably and refer to the generation of an output by AI without
human intervention. In this scenario, AI can change its behavior during
operation to respond to unanticipated information or events. This is to be
distinguished from “AI-assisted” outputs that are generated with material
human intervention and/or direction.
World Intell. Prop. Org., Revised Issues Paper on Intellectual Property Policy and Artificial
Intelligence, ¶ 12, WIPO Doc. WIPO/IP/AI/2/GE/20/1 Rev. (May 21, 2020); see also Peter
K. Yu, Artificial Intelligence, the Law–Machine Interface, and Fair Use Automation, 72 ALA.
L. REV. 187, 232 n.218 (2020) [hereinafter Yu, Artificial Intelligence] (collecting sources
that discuss the concept of “intelligence augmentation”).
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emphatically, “no one has ever exhibited even one work that could plausibly
claim to have a computer for an ‘author’ in the sense that the Copyright Act
uses the term.” 79 While Professor Grimmelman’s observation correctly
captured the current state of technology, one policy question that deserves
greater policy and scholarly attention concerns whether copyright law needs
amendments if the human creative contributions are significantly reduced.
After all, in the future, we are likely to see many situations involving a mix
of human and machine contributions, rather than contributions from humans
or machines alone.80
For instance, if the human creative contributions have been reduced
from eighty or ninety percent to, say, ten or twenty percent, should copyright
law be amended to account for the more limited human creative input?
Answering this question will require us to abandon a binary debate
concerning whether copyright should be granted to authors—or, in
constitutional terms, whether machines can be “authors” within the meaning
of the U.S. Copyright Clause. 81 Instead, we should explore what creative
contributions are worthy of copyright protection.
Some good questions to ask are what the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office included in the copyright section of its consultation document:
Assuming involvement by a natural person is or should be required,
what kind of involvement would or should be sufficient so that the
work qualifies for copyright protection? For example, should it be
sufficient if a person (i) designed the AI [artificial intelligence]
algorithm or process that created the work; (ii) contributed to the design

79

James Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work—And It’s a
Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403, 403 (2016).
80
See Rebecca Crootof, “Cyborg Justice” and the Risk of Technological–Legal Lock-in, 119
COLUM. L. REV. F. 233 (2019) (discussing the benefits and side effects of hybrid human–AI
judicial systems, or “cyborg justice”); Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines:
The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2019) (explaining why
complementary legal automation will play a bigger role in the legal profession than
substitutive legal automation); Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat the Law? The Rise
of Hybrid Social-Ordering Systems, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2001 (2019) (describing the
development of hybrid machine–human systems as the “predictable future of legal
adjudication” and exploring the prospects and limitations of such development); Yu,
Artificial Intelligence, supra note 78 (emphasizing the importance of the law-machine
interface in the artificial intelligence context).
81
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” (emphasis added)).
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of the algorithm or process; (iii) chose data used by the algorithm for
training or otherwise; (iv) caused the AI algorithm or process to be used
to yield the work; or (v) engaged in some specific combination of the
foregoing activities? Are there other contributions a person could make
in a potentially copyrightable AI-generated work in order to be
considered an “author”?82

It will also be useful to explore the degree of human control over works
generated substantially by artificial intelligence.83 In a long line of copyright
cases that date back to the nineteenth century, courts have made clear that
“[a]n author . . . is ‘he to whom anything owes its origin.’”84 Had Marshall in
our imaginary scenario returned to academia in time to join this debate, he
would be eager to help us understand these complex authorship issues.85
Interestingly, the arrival of artificial intelligence is actually not that
surprising to those following the historical literature on the interplay of law
and artificial intelligence. Even though Marshall was frozen from 1978 to
2021, upon his return he would be likely to find some similarity and
continuity between what was published in the 1970s and what legal scholars
write today. Indeed, a number of articles concerning how artificial
intelligence will change the legal system were published shortly before he
was frozen.86
In sum, the popularization of the internet in the mid-1990s and the
advent of a plethora of digital technologies have greatly transformed

82

U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 73, at 22.
Cf. Lindsay v. The Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, No. 97 Civ. 9248(HB),
1999 WL 816163, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999) (“All else being equal, where a plaintiff
alleges that he exercised such a high degree of control over a film operation . . . such that the
final product duplicates his conceptions and visions of what the film should look like, the
plaintiff may be said to be an ‘author’ within the meaning of the Copyright Act.” (emphasis
added)).
84
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
85
See LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 109 (“[C]opyright should be denied for computer-generated
works involving insignificant or no user discretion. As in any other legal determination,
difficult line-drawing processes will arise . . . to determine whether the user of a program has
supplied enough original authorship to merit copyright.”).
86
See, e.g., Bruce G. Buchanan & Thomas E. Headrick, Some Speculation About Artificial
Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 23 STAN. L. REV. 40 (1970); Anthony D’Amato,
Can/Should Computers Replace Judges?, 11 GA. L. REV. 1277 (1977); L. Thorne McCarty,
Reflections on Taxman: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 90
HARV. L. REV. 837 (1977). The literature cited here was collected in Eugene Volokh, Chief
Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1137 n.3 (2019).
83
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copyright law. It has led countries to adopt new rules at the international
level—such as those found in the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT),87 which
the next Part will discuss in greater detail. At the domestic level, the digital
revolution has also resulted in the introduction of new laws that aim to
improve copyright protection in the digital environment. Of these laws, there
is no better example than the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 88 The
addition of this lengthy statute has caused many treatise and hornbook
authors in the copyright field to substantially revise their works.89
III.

NEW RIGHTS AND LIMITATIONS

From the mention of the translation right in the original 1886 text of
the Berne Convention 90 to the explicit protection of the right of public
performance in the 1948 Brussels Act 91 to the formal recognition of the
reproduction right in the 1967 Stockholm Act,92 the Convention has seen the
arrival or expansion of a wide array of economic rights. Since the 1928 Rome
Act, the Convention has also protected two forms of moral rights: “the right
to claim authorship of the work, as well as the right to object to any distortion,
mutilation or other modification of the said work which would be prejudicial
to [the author’s] honour or reputation.”93
In addition, the revision process has altered the duration of copyright
protection. While Article 7 of the 1908 Berlin Act included an optional
requirement that such protection lasts for the life of the author plus fifty
years,94 the 1948 Brussels Act made this requirement mandatory.95 Today,
the Berne standard for the duration of copyright protection remains the life
of the author plus fifty years, even though the European Union, the United

87

WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121 [hereinafter WCT].
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
89
A case in point is Marshall’s Understanding Copyright Law, which increased by close to
150 pages from the second to third edition. Compare MARSHALL A. LEAFFER,
UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW (2d ed. 1995) (400 pages), with MARSHALL A. LEAFFER,
UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW (3d ed. 1999) (544 pages).
90
Original Text, supra note 55, arts. 5, 9.
91
Brussels Act, supra note 60, art. 11.
92
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 9, Sept. 9, 1886,
828 U.N.T.S 221, 239 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967).
93
Rome Act, supra note 57, art. 6bis. Such protection, the conditions for which were initially
governed by domestic legislation, eventually became mandatory.
94
Berlin Act, supra note 54, art. 7(1).
95
Brussels Act, supra note 60, art. 7(1).
88
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States, and other jurisdictions have extended the protection for another
twenty years.96
The previous Part has discussed the advent of digital technologies.
This Part turns to the new rights that have to be created to respond to those
technologies. Traditionally, the Berne Convention has been revised every
twenty years or so. Since its establishment in 1886, the Convention was
revised in 1908, 1928, 1948, 1967, and 1971. Interestingly, the Convention
has not been revised again since 1971. Instead, a new treaty known as the
WCT was established as a “special agreement” pursuant to Article 20 of the
Berne Convention.97
In December 1996, WIPO member states convened a diplomatic
conference that led to the adoption of this treaty and the WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).98 Because members were unable to reach
consensus over the standards governing the digital transmission of
copyrighted works—with European countries favoring adjustments to the
right of communication to the public while the United States preferring
alternative approaches 99 —the WCT fostered a compromise by accepting
what commentators have generally referred to as the “umbrella solution.”100
This solution “allowed the treaty’s contacting parties to provide for the
agreed-upon protections without specifying which rights they would use to
provide substance for these protections.”101 Article 6(1), which covers the
right of distribution, provides: “Authors of literary and artistic works shall

96

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (providing a copyright term of the life of the author plus
seventy years); Council Directive 93/98/EEC, of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of
Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 1(1), 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9, 11
(providing a copyright term of the life of the author plus seventy years).
97
See Berne Convention, supra note 3, art. 20 (“The Governments of the countries of the
Union reserve the right to enter into special agreements among themselves, in so far as such
agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those granted by the Convention, or
contain other provisions not contrary to this Convention.”).
98
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203; see also
Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 2, at 369–74 (discussing this diplomatic
conference).
99
See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 369, 393–94
(1997) (discussing these differences).
100
See MIHÁLY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO
TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 205–06, 496–97 (2002)
(discussing the “umbrella solution”).
101
Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong, 48 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693, 726 (2010).
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enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of
the original and copies of their works through sale or other transfer of
ownership.”102 Article 8, which protects the right of communication to the
public, further states: “Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the
exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of the
original and copies of their works through sale or other transfer of
ownership.”103
At the domestic level, this umbrella solution has sparked challenging
questions concerning whether the right of distribution has been expanded to
cover the right of making available, which does not exist, at least explicitly,
in section 106 of the U.S. Copyright Act. 104 In Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Thomas, for instance, the district court carefully explained why the
distribution right under section 106(3) does not encompass the act of making
available or an offer to do those acts specified in the provision.105 By contrast,
other courts seem to be more willing to undertake a dynamic interpretation
and provide updates to copyright law. As the U.S. Copyright Office noted in
its study on the making available right:
The courts of the United States have been less consistent in their
analyses and decisions. On the one hand, the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. confirms that
the public performance right encompasses the transmission of
copyrighted works to the public through individualized streams. On the
other hand, in the context of offers of access to copyrighted content,
some district courts have questioned the existence of the right under
U.S. law, ultimately failing to recognize a cause of action where
copyright owners cannot prove that downloads or receipt occurred.
Others have wholly rejected the right out of hand, failing to discuss or
even acknowledge the international obligations of the United States. At
the appellate level, courts have yet to conclusively resolve these issues
in cases involving works in digital format. There are, however, two
appellate decisions holding that, in the context of a library offering

102

WCT, supra note 87, art. 6 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 8 (emphasis added).
104
The distribution right in the U.S. Copyright Act involves specific statutory language: “to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
105
579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1216–23 (D. Minn. 2008).
103
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physical copies of a work to the public, distribution does not
necessarily require an actual transfer of copies.106

Another development that deserves attention concerns how much
protection copyright law will provide to the reproduction of creative works
in the digital environment, including the generation of temporary copies in
computer memory.107 That question seems settled in the United States, due
in part to the findings of the National Commission on the New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works, which declared that “the placement of a work
into a computer is the preparation of a copy.”108 At the international level,
however, Berne members remained deeply divided over how to handle digital
copies at the time of the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference.109 During the
negotiations, members ended up leaving the issue out of the WCT text.
Instead, they accepted the following agreed statement concerning Article 1(4)
toward the end of the negotiations:
The reproduction right, as set out in Article 9 of the Berne Convention,
and the exceptions permitted thereunder, fully apply in the digital
environment, in particular to the use of works in digital form. It is
understood that the storage of a protected work in digital form in an
electronic medium constitutes a reproduction within the meaning of
Article 9 of the Berne Convention.110

106

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., THE MAKING AVAILABLE RIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES: A
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 3 (2016).
107
See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993)
(“[S]ince we find that the copy created in the RAM [Random Access Memory] can be
‘perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,’ we hold that the loading of software
into the RAM creates a copy under the Copyright Act.”).
108
NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT ON NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 13 (1978).
109
See Samuelson, supra note 99, at 372 (“Clinton administration officials sought approval
in Geneva for international norms that would have . . . granted copyright owners an exclusive
right to control virtually all temporary reproductions of protected works in the random access
memory of computers . . . .”).
110
Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty Adopted by the Diplomatic
Conference
on
December
20,
1996,
WIPO
Doc.
TRT/WCT/002,
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/295456 [https://perma.cc/776R-KA32] (providing the
statement concerning Article 1(4) of the WCT).
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Many commentators found this statement controversial, considering that it
was adopted in the eleventh hour when some delegations had already left the
diplomatic conference.111
Apart from the new rights relating to copyright protection in the
digital environment, there has also been growing attention on the
development of copyright limitations and exceptions—an issue that is
relevant to both the online and offline worlds. 112 Upon his return in our
imaginary scenario, Marshall would be unlikely to find such discussion
surprising. After all, during the revision of the Berne Convention in both
Stockholm and Paris, limitations and exceptions were a major issue for
developing country members. The 1971 Paris Act eventually added an
optional appendix to the Berne Convention, which was derived from the
Protocol Regarding Developing Countries adopted in Stockholm in 1967 but
that had failed to be ratified.113 Today, the Berne appendix “remains the only
bulk access mechanism tool in international copyright law.” 114 To some

111

As I noted in an earlier book chapter:
[T]his agreed statement was drafted towards the very end of the
negotiations and in suspicious circumstances: while the first sentence was
adopted by consensus, the second was not. According to Seth Greenstein,
who observed the WIPO diplomatic meeting on behalf of the Electronic
Industries Association, the final vote count was 48 in favour, 13 against,
28 abstentions and a whopping 63 absences.
Peter K. Yu, The Copy in Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO
IM/MATERIAL GOODS 65, 75 (Jessica C. Lai & Antoinette Maget Dominicé eds., 2016)
(footnotes omitted); see also Samuelson, supra note 99, at 390–92 (discussing the eleventhhour negotiations).
112
The Berne Convention included copyright limitations and exceptions from the very
beginning. Article 8 of the original 1886 text states explicitly that the Convention does not
affect “the liberty of extracting portions from literary or artistic works for use in publications
destined for educational or scientific purposes, or for chrestomathies.” Original Text, supra
note 55, art. 8.
113
See Yu, Development Agendas, supra note 49, at 580–81 (discussing the stalemate over
the ratification of the protocol).
114
Ruth L. Okediji, The International Copyright System: Limitations, Exceptions and Public
Interest Considerations for Developing Countries 16 (UNCTAD–ICTSD Project on IPRs &
Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 15, 2006), https://unctad.org/system/files/officialdocument/iteipc200610_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6VL-N44F].
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extent, the ongoing discussion of limitations and exceptions bring back part
of the old debate on intellectual property and development.115
In recent years, many jurisdictions have introduced a new copyright
exception for text and data mining,116 similar to the flexibility provided by
the transformative use doctrine in the United States.117 For example, section
29A(1) of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 permits “[t]he
making of a copy of a work by a person who has lawful access to the work”
in order to “carry out a computational analysis of anything recorded in the
work for the sole purpose of research for a non-commercial purpose.” 118
Articles 3 and 4 of the EU Directive on Copyright and Related Rights in the
Digital Single Market also create new exceptions for text and data mining,
which is defined as “any automated analytical technique aimed at analysing
text and data in digital form in order to generate information which includes
but is not limited to patterns, trends and correlations.” 119 In addition,

115

See Peter K. Yu, Déjà Vu in the International Intellectual Property Regime, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 113, 114–17 (Matthew David & Debora Halbert
eds., 2015) (discussing the establishment of development agendas as a recurring
development in the international intellectual property regime and linking the development
agendas in the 2000s to the earlier development agendas in the 1960s and 1970s).
116
For discussions of the importance of exceptions for text and data mining to the copyright
systems, see generally Christophe Geiger et al., Crafting a Text and Data Mining Exception
for Machine Learning and Big Data in the Digital Single Market, in IP AND DIGITAL TRADE,
supra note 74, at 95; Michael W. Carroll, Copyright and the Progress of Science: Why Text
and Data Mining Is Lawful, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893 (2019); Matthew Sag, The New
Legal Landscape for Text Mining and Machine Learning, 66 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
291 (2019).
117
See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216–17 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Google’s
making of a digital copy of Plaintiffs’ books for the purpose of enabling a search for
identification of books containing a term of interest to the searcher involves a highly
transformative purpose, in the sense intended by Campbell.”); Authors Guild, Inc. v.
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he creation of a full-text searchable database
is a quintessentially transformative use.”). See generally Edward Lee, Technological Fair
Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (2010) (discussing fair use in the technological context).
118
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 29A(1) (U.K.).
119
Directive 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on
Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Directives
96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, arts. 2(2), 3–4, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92, 112.
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commentators have paid considerable attention to the exceptions for parody,
satire, caricature, and pastiche120—and, more recently, to the right to quote.121
When limitations and exceptions are being discussed in the TRIPS
context, such discussion often brings up the three-step test in Article 13.122
Derived from Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention,123 that TRIPS provision
requires WTO members to “confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive
rights to [1] certain special cases which [2] do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and [3] do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the right holder.”124 Although the Berne provision was adopted to
enlarge the policy space for member states to develop new copyright
limitations and exceptions,125 the TRIPS Agreement’s incorporation of the
three-step test has raised the question about whether WTO members intended
to emphasize the test’s constraining function while undercutting its enabling

120

See generally SABINE JACQUES, THE PARODY EXCEPTION IN COPYRIGHT LAW (2019);
AMY LAI, THE RIGHT TO PARODY: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COPYRIGHT AND FREE
SPEECH (2021).
121
See generally TANYA APLIN & LIONEL BENTLY, GLOBAL MANDATORY FAIR USE: THE
NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO QUOTE COPYRIGHT WORKS (2020).
122
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 13.
123
Berne Convention, supra note 3, art. 9(2) (“It shall be a matter for legislation in the
countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases,
provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”).
124
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 13.
125
See Martin Senftleben, From Flexible Balancing Tool to Quasi-Constitutional
Straitjacket—How the EU Cultivates the Constraining Function of the Three-Step Test, in
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM: HEDGING
EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS 83 (Jonathan Griffiths & Tuomas Mylly eds., 2021) (expressing concerns
about interpretations of the three-step test that focus on its constraining function at the
expense of its enabling function); Peter K. Yu, The Confuzzling Rhetoric Against New
Copyright Exceptions, in 1 KRITIKA: ESSAYS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 278, 289 (Peter
Drahos et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter Yu, Confuzzling Rhetoric] (“Instead of creating a large
number of specific exceptions to accommodate the different approaches taken by the then
Berne members, the drafters came up with a flexible test to ensure that members could
introduce minor exceptions without waiting for the Berne Convention to be revised, as long
as these exceptions pass the test.”); Christophe Geiger et al., The Three-Step Test Revisited:
How to Use the Test’s Flexibility in National Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 581,
616 (2014) (“From the perspective of national legislation, it would seem more logical to
interpret the three-step test as not designed exclusively for restricting new use privileges, but
also as enabling them. . . . Many use privileges that have become widespread at the national
level are directly based on the international three-step test.”).
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function.126 This question has become even more important considering that
the WCT has incorporated the same test.127
Thus far, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has had only one
opportunity to determine whether a copyright limitation or exception passes
the three-step test. In January 1999, Ireland and other members of the
European Union filed a WTO complaint challenging section 110(5) of the
U.S. Copyright Act, which includes an exception for using homestyle
equipment to play copyrighted music without compensating copyright
holders and a business exception that enables restaurants and small
establishments to do the same.128 Although the WTO panel eventually found
the business exception inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement,129 Congress
declined to bring the law in conformity with the Agreement. Today, section
110(5)(b), which codified that exception, remains intact despite the WTO
panel’s negative finding.130
In the past two decades, commentators have also questioned whether
the fair use provision in U.S. copyright law complies with the TRIPS
Agreement. 131 Although other WTO members have not used the WTO

126

See Marshall Leaffer, The Uncertain Future of Fair Use in a Global Information
Marketplace, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 861–62 (2001) [hereinafter Leaffer, Uncertain Future]
(“Article 9(2) merely permits nations to provide for limitations on copyright in certain
circumstances. It leaves open the possibility that other limitations may be allowable on the
basis of other treaty provisions. By contrast, article 13 expressly restricts allowable
limitations and exceptions to those that comply with its standards.”).
127
See WCT, supra note 87, art. 10(1) (incorporating the three-step test).
128
17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
129
See Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, ¶ 7.1(b), WTO
doc. WT/DS160/R (adopted June 15, 2000) (finding that section 110(5)(b) of the U.S.
Copyright Act “does not meet the requirements of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement and
is thus inconsistent with Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971)
as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by Article 9.1 of that Agreement”).
130
See Peter K. Yu, Are Developing Countries Playing a Better TRIPS Game?, 16 UCLA J.
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFFS. 311, 337–38 (2011) (“Notwithstanding the adverse panel report,
the United States has refused to update its statute to ensure compliance with the TRIPS
Agreement. The United States also has refused to make annual payments to the European
Union, even though the arbitration award was determined to be €1,219,900 per year. The
only payment it has made thus far was $3.3 million, which was provided more than a year
after the arbitration proceeding.” (footnote omitted)).
131
See Leaffer, Uncertain Future, supra note 126, at 861–63 (noting the serious reservations
concerning the conformity of the U.S. fair use provision with the three-step test); Ruth
Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75,
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dispute settlement process to challenge the U.S. fair use provision, and are
unlikely to do so in the future, 132 the debate concerning its consistency
remains unsettled. In many jurisdictions, which range from Australia to Hong
Kong to South Africa, complications raised by the three-step test continue to
pose challenges to copyright reforms that seek to introduce an open-ended
fair use provision.133
Finally, it is worth mentioning the ongoing effort to create rights at
WIPO to protect traditional cultural expressions. Although some readers may
quickly point out that these rights are being negotiated at the
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore,134 not in a forum relating to
the Berne Convention, one should not forget that the efforts to strengthen the
protections for traditional cultural expressions—or what used to be called
“folklore”—actually began with the Tunis Model Law on Copyright for
Developing Countries (“Tunis Model Law”). 135 This model law could be

114–23 (2000) (noting the incompatibility between fair use and the three-step test). But see
Justin Hughes, Fair Use and Its Politics—at Home and Abroad, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN
AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 234, 236–56 (Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017) (arguing
that fair use will pass the three-step test because it is a mechanism for establishing specific
copyright exceptions).
132
See Austln. L. Reform Comm’n, Copyright and the Digital Economy (Report No 122,
Nov. 2013) 120–22 (noting the lack of challenges to fair use in international fora); Peter K.
Yu, The Quest for a User-Friendly Copyright Regime in Hong Kong, 32 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 283, 309–10 (2016) (explaining why other WTO members are unlikely to challenge
the U.S. fair use provision, including the transformative use doctrine, before the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body).
133
See, e.g., Austln. L. Reform Comm’n, supra note 132, at 116–22 (explaining why reform
introducing fair use in Australia will pass the three-step test); Yu, Confuzzling Rhetoric,
supra note 125, at 287–93 (discussing the three-step test in relation to copyright reform in
Hong Kong); Letter from Sean Flynn, Dir., Program on Info. Just. & Intell. Prop., Am. Univ.
Wash. Coll. of L., to the Portfolio Comm. on Trade & Indus., Parliament of the Republic of
S. Afr. (July 9, 2021), https://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/User-RightsNetwork-CAB-Submission-July-9-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVC9-WGJ3] (explaining
why reform introducing fair use in South Africa will pass the three-step test).
134
Intergovernmental
Committee
(IGC),
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc [https://perma.cc/3FJ2-XFRQ] (last visited Dec. 4, 2021). See
generally PROTECTING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: THE WIPO INTERGOVERNMENTAL
COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE (Daniel F. Robinson et al. eds., 2017) (collecting articles that
offer detailed analyses of the Intergovernmental Committee’s effort).
135
Tunis Model Law on Copyright for Developing Countries, WIPO Doc. 812(E) (1976),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_812.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DBY7-
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traced back even further to the African Study Conference on Copyright in
Brazzaville in August 1963.136 Jointly organized by WIPO’s predecessor137
and UNESCO, that conference sought “to assist the new African states to
formulate appropriate principles for the drafting of their own copyright
laws.”138
As somebody who has presented on the topic of traditional knowledge
and traditional cultural expressions and who also has a life companion in an
anthropologist, Marshall, upon his return in our imaginary scenario, would
certainly find these developments highly interesting. That these
developments bring back memories of the Tunis Model Law, which was
adopted only two short years before he was frozen, would also make these
developments less surprising to him.
IV.

NEW EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

Thus far, this Article has focused on developments internal to the
Berne Convention. However, some of the biggest challenges to the
international intellectual property regime in the past four decades came from
outside, raising questions about the exogenous limits to intellectual property

XDV7]; see also Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property
Regimes: A Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa
and the United States, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 769, 813–17 (1999) (discussing the Tunis Model
Law).
136
See Monika Dommann, Lost in Tradition? Reconsidering History of Folklore and Its
Legal Protection Since 1800, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL CULTURAL
EXPRESSIONS IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 3, 11 (Christoph Beat Graber & Mira BurriNenova eds., 2008) (tracing the protection of folklore to the Brazzaville Conference); see
also Charles F. Johnson, The Origins of the Stockholm Protocol, 18 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 91, 103–08 (1970) (discussing this conference).
137
WIPO’s predecessor is the United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual
Property, known commonly by its French acronym “BIRPI” (for Bureaux internationaux
reunis pour la protection de la propriete intellectuelle).
138
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 49, at 888.
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rights. 139 Because there are many different external influences, 140 which
range from international trade to human rights and from public health to
biological diversity,141 this Part focuses on the first two issue areas. These
areas are highlighted not only because they are relevant to the discussion of
the Berne Convention, but also because they would be likely to receive
Marshall’s attention.142
Even though Marshall was frozen in 1978 in our imaginary scenario,
upon his return he would not be surprised to find international trade playing
an increasingly important role in the international copyright regime. After all,
the Berne Convention was created in part to respond to the expanded bilateral
trade between the European powers, 143 and the ineffectiveness in using

139

See Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L.
REV. 979, 1008 (2009) [hereinafter Yu, Objectives and Principles] (noting the “exogenous
limits that can be found in related regimes, such as those concerning public health, human
rights, biological diversity, food and agriculture, and information and communications”);
Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 777, 794–96
(2010) (discussing the need to establish internal and external maximum limits on intellectual
property rights).
140
Cf. Leaffer, Uncertain Future, supra note 126, at 863 (surmising that “the fate of the fair
use doctrine in the United States may be determined even more by outside influences than
internal politics”).
141
See Yu, Development Agendas, supra note 49, at 511–15, 522–38 (discussing the
development agendas in international trade, human rights, public health, biological diversity,
and other international fora).
142
See, e.g., Marshall Leaffer, Fair Use, Transformative Use and Free Speech, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 417 (Paul Torremans ed., 4th ed., 2020)
(discussing the support that the transformative use doctrine has provided to First Amendment
values by facilitating the production of new creative works); Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting
United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV.
273 (1991) [hereinafter Leaffer, New Multilateralism] (providing a pioneering discussion of
the TRIPS negotiations and advocating caution in addressing the divergent intellectual
property positions taken by developed and developing countries).
143
See Paul Edward Geller, Copyright History and the Future: What’s Culture Got to Do
with It?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 228 (2000) (“In the nineteenth century,
industries grew to serve new markets. Artisanal workshops were replaced by ever-more
rationalized and highly capitalized enterprises that operated on increasingly global scales. . . .
In response to industrialization, copyright was augmented both with new economic and
moral rights, while it was transplanted worldwide.” (emphasis in original)); Yu, Currents
and Crosscurrents, supra note 2, at 333–34 (“As cross-border markets developed and
expanded, countries became concerned about the limited national protection and the virtually
nonexistent international protection for foreign authors and inventors.”).
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bilateral conventions to protect foreign authors.144 During the Tokyo Round
of Trade Negotiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the United States, with strong support from Levi
Strauss, pushed for the development of an anti-counterfeiting code.145 That
proposal was a precursor to the greater demands for a separate intellectual
property instrument during the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (“Uruguay Round”) in Punta del Este, Uruguay.146 Although the
proposal for an anti-counterfeiting code did not emerge until 1979, after
Marshall was frozen, the Tokyo Round was launched in September 1973,
when he worked at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.147
What he might find surprising upon his return, however, is the sharp
turn of international negotiations and the aggressive push for the TRIPS
Agreement in the Uruguay Round. 148 Only a few years before, the
international community was addressing the oil crisis brought about by the
1973 Arab-Israeli War and the subsequent embargo imposed by the Arab

144

For discussions of the use of bilateral treaties to protect foreign authors before the
establishment of the Berne Convention, see generally STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 43–55 (1938);
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 49, at 27–40; Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra
note 2, at 334–35.
145
See DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT 9 (2002) (discussing the push for an anti-counterfeiting code during the Tokyo
Round); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 40–41 (2003) [hereinafter Sell, PRIVATE POWER]
(discussing the push for an anti-counterfeiting code during the Tokyo Round). A revised
proposal was later submitted in preparation for the next round of GATT talks. Agreement on
Measures to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods, GATT Doc. L/5382 (Oct. 18,
1982),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91000099.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R7R8-ZK4K].
146
See Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Sept. 20, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1623, 1626 (setting out the negotiating objectives of the TRIPS
Agreement); see also Yu, Objectives and Principles, supra note 139, at 983–84 (discussing
these objectives and the Punta del Este Declaration).
147
Ministerial Meeting Tokyo, 12–14 September 1973 Declaration, GATT Doc. GATT/1134
(Sept.
14,
1973),
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/GATT/1134.PDF
[https://perma.cc/J36V-TAKR].
148
For the discussions of the origins of the TRIPS negotiations, see generally DANIEL
GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 3–27 (3d ed. 2008);
THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND
NEGOTIATIONS (Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015); JAYASHREE WATAL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11–47 (2001);
Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 371–79
(2006).
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members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). 149 That crisis helped precipitate the development of the New
International Economic Order,150 which “sought to bring about fundamental
changes in the international economic system by redistributing power, wealth,
and resources from the developed North to the less developed South.”151 As
Chantal Thomas recounted:
The origins of [the momentum to establish this new economic order]
lay in three changes to the international order in the postwar era: first,
the “massive expansion of international organization for cooperative
purposes”; second, the “growing importance of states representing
non-Western civilizations” in the wake of decolonization and
independence movements; and third, “the growing gap between the
economically developed and the economically less developed
countries.”152

From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, developing countries were also busy
developing the International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology
under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD).153 This code sought “to eliminate those clauses in

149

See Essam E. Galal, The Developing Countries’ Quest for a Code, in INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ORIGINS AND AFTERMATH OF THE UNITED NATIONS
NEGOTIATIONS ON A DRAFT CODE OF CONDUCT 199, 200 (Surendra J. Patel et al. eds., 2001)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER] (noting, in relation to the drafting of
the International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, “the political tensions
during this period of the cold war, the Arab-Israeli War in 1973 being one example, as well
as the economic tension as a result of the oil embargo, the oil crisis and the obligatory
recycling of its funds to the supposed victims of the crisis”); Yu, Development Agendas,
supra note 49, at 561–62 (noting that those negotiations “were . . . colored by the 1973 ArabIsraeli War and the oil crisis” (footnote omitted)).
150
G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order (May 1, 1974). For discussions of the New International Economic Order
and related issues, see generally MOHAMMED BEDAJOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER (1979); ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN, GLOBAL BARGAINING: UNCTAD AND
THE QUEST FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979); THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE (Jagdish N. Bhagwati ed.,
1977).
151
Yu, Development Agendas, supra note 49, at 499.
152
Chantal Thomas, Transfer of Technology in the Contemporary International Order, 22
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2096, 2105 (1999).
153
For discussions of the negotiation of this Code, see generally MICHAEL BLAKENEY,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 131–61
(1989); INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 149; SUSAN K. SELL, POWER
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transfer of technology contracts which are harmful to the economic
development of developing countries,” as well as other restrictive foreign
investment practices.154
This pro-development effort did not last long, however.155 By the late
1980s, developed countries had successfully pushed through intellectual
property negotiations at the Uruguay Round, which led to the eventual
adoption of the TRIPS Agreement in April 1994 and the introduction of new
international minimum standards in different areas of intellectual property
law across all WTO members.156 Incorporated by reference into the TRIPS
Agreement are Articles 1 to 21 of the Berne Convention and its appendix.157
Because of this arrangement, the Berne norms no longer evolve solely
within the intellectual property forum. Instead, changes brought about by the
WTO—in particular, its mandatory dispute settlement process—are just as
important. As Laurence Helfer observed, “[w]hat began as a regime with a
single intergovernmental organization—WIPO—then became a bimodal
regime with two predominant organizations—the WTO and WIPO.” 158

AND IDEAS: NORTH–SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST

79–106
(1998); Peter K. Yu, International Technology Contracts, Restrictive Covenants and the
UNCTAD Code, in EMPLOYEES, TRADE SECRETS AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 41
(Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2017); Yu, Development Agendas,
supra note 49, at 493–505.
154
Ton J.M. Zuijdwijk, The UNCTAD Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, 24
MCGILL L.J. 562, 563 (1978).
155
The negotiations stopped in 1985. See SELL, PRIVATE POWER, supra note 145, at 89
(“Beginning in October 1978, negotiators met in six sessions, the last of which was held in
Geneva in May 1985.”); see also Galal, supra note 149, at 204–08 (discussing the breakdown
of the 1983 Code Conference).
156
The TRIPS Agreement explicitly covers eight forms of intellectual property rights: (1)
copyright and related rights; (2) trademarks; (3) geographical indications; (4) industrial
designs; (5) patents; (6) plant variety protection; (7) layout designs of integrated circuits; and
(8) the protection of undisclosed information (including trade secrets). TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 22, arts. 9–39.
157
Id. art. 9.1.
158
Laurence R. Helfer, Mediating Interactions in an Expanding International Intellectual
Property Regime, 36 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 123, 136 (2004). As Professor Helfer
explained:
[T]he shift from WIPO to GATT to TRIPs was not intended to eclipse
WIPO. Rather, it established a new venue for trade-related intellectual
property lawmaking, in effect creating a bimodal intellectual property
regime within which the two organizations shared authority according to
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Indeed, many commentators viewed the adoption of the WCT, the WPPT,
and other activities as urgent efforts that WIPO introduced after the WTO’s
establishment to rejuvenate this U.N. specialized agency and to reclaim
intellectual property norm-setting activities.159
Because of the considerable gap between the intellectual property
policies in developed and developing countries, greater sensitivity to policy
differences is in order. As a noted intellectual property scholar declared in a
prescient article published amid the TRIPS negotiations:
Including the developing countries in the GATT system will require a
less legalistic method than many are advocating at this time. As the
GATT negotiations have shown, the member nations may be unable to
agree on clear, precisely stated, enforceable substantive rules. The
reason for this inability is obvious. One need only consider the nature
of the world trading system, which is comprised of highly disparate
units, varying widely in political orientation, social organization, and
stages of development. A certain amount of differentiation in this
environment will have to be accepted. . . . A system that does not take
into account the differing cultural, economic, and moral aspirations of

their respective areas of expertise. Whereas the WTO emphasized
implementation, enforcement, and dispute settlement, WIPO focused on
generating new forms of intellectual property protection, administering
existing intellectual property agreements, and providing technical
assistance to developing countries.
Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 25 (2004).
159
See CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION:
RESURGENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 66 (2006) (noting “a sustained campaign by
the WIPO itself to return the organization to the center of global intellectual property policy
making”); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property
System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 1005 (2002) (“[T]he sudden emergence of the WTO as
part of the international intellectual property lawmaking process seemed to energize WIPO,
resulting in the conclusion of several new treaties in copyright, patent and trademark law, as
well as the reorganization . . . designed to make WIPO fit for the twenty-first century.”
(footnotes omitted)); Sisule F. Musungu & Graham Dutfield, Multilateral Agreements and a
TRIPS-Plus World: The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 11 (Quaker
United Nations Off., TRIPS Issues Paper No. 3, 2003) (“In a move aimed at preserving its
relevance in the new scenario, WIPO quickly adopted a resolution in 1994 mandating the
International Bureau to provide technical assistance to WIPO members on TRIPS-related
issues. This was followed by a second resolution in 1995 to enter into a cooperation
Agreement with the WTO for WIPO to provide technical assistance to developing country
members of the WTO irrespective of their membership in WIPO.”).
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the developing countries will be doomed to failure and will not be
enforced effectively by those countries on which it is imposed.160

These words of wisdom remain highly relevant today. In the past four
decades, most of the disagreements between developed and developing
countries in the intellectual property area concerned their different policy
choices.161 Because these two groups of countries continue to disagree—at
times, vehemently—the United States Trade Representative has deployed
strong-arm tactics to induce copyright reforms abroad, including the use of
the widely criticized Section 301 reports162 and the WTO dispute settlement
process. 163 Not having much success in improving intellectual property
enforcement in developing countries, the United States and its like-minded
trading partners have resorted to the negotiation of bilateral, regional, and
plurilateral trade agreements, including both the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement 164 and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 165 (which has

160

Leaffer, New Multilateralism, supra note 142, at 306.
See
Disputes
by
Agreement,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/P5F7-3ZXZ] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022) (listing disputes involving all the
WTO agreements, including the TRIPS Agreement). See generally Peter K. Yu, The
Comparative Economics of International Intellectual Property Agreements, in
COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 282 (Theodore Eisenberg & Giovanni B. Ramello eds.,
2016) (using comparative law and economics to question the TRIPS Agreement’s purported
benefits to developing countries).
162
Section 301 permits the U.S. President to investigate and impose sanctions on countries
engaging in unfair trade practices that threaten the United States’ economic interests. See
19 U.S.C. §§ 2411–2420. For discussions of the Section 301 process, see generally PETER
DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 85–107 (2002); Joe Karaganis & Sean Flynn, Networked
Governance and the USTR, in MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 75 (Joe Karaganis
ed., 2011); Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry’s Influence on Intellectual Property Negotiations
and Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87 (1994).
163
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 64 (mandating the use of the WTO dispute
settlement process to resolve disputes arising under the TRIPS Agreement).
164
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 243;
see also Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1 (2011) (discussing the
complex politics behind the negotiations for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement);
Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975 (2011)
(criticizing those negotiations).
165
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text
[https://perma.cc/5J9E-DG37]; see also Peter K. Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities,
37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1129 (2014) (criticizing the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations).
161
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been incorporated into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership166 following the United States’ withdrawal167).
Another area that has emerged in the past two decades is the arrival
of the human rights discourse in the intellectual property field. Although the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights168 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 169 were adopted in 1948 and 1966,
respectively, the interplay of intellectual property and human rights “did not
receive much attention until WIPO and the [Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights] organized a panel on November 9,
1998 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the [Universal Declaration
of Human Rights].”170 This event generated a series of papers that remain
widely cited today.171
Although U.S. judges rarely discuss the tensions or conflicts between
domestic copyright law and international human rights treaties, those tensions
and conflicts are not new to these judges. As early as the decision of Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the United States Supreme
Court has engaged in the tension between copyright law and the First
Amendment.172 That case concerned the unauthorized publication of excerpts
from President Gerald Ford’s memoirs, A Time to Heal.173 In later cases, the
Court advanced the transformative use doctrine to protect the free speech
interests in creating parodies in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 174
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addressed the potential intrusion of the extended copyright term on free
speech interests in Eldred v. Ashcroft,175 and explained why the restoration
of copyright protection under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994
did not inhibit First Amendment interests in Golan v. Holder.176 All of these
Supreme Court cases have raised important questions about how best to
balance copyright protection against human rights interests.
Although courts and commentators have repeatedly noted that
copyright should be seen as an “engine of free expression,”177 quoting Justice
O’Connor’s memorable words,178 and that the tensions and conflicts between
copyright law and the First Amendment interests may not need separate
balancing,179 many of these views reflect an over-reading of Harper & Row.
What Justice O’Connor said in the opinion was that “it should not be
forgotten that the Framers [of the U.S. Constitution] intended copyright itself
to be the engine of free expression,”180 not that the current copyright system
is the engine of free expression.181 As copyright protection rapidly expanded
in the past few decades and as interest group politics had actively shaped the
development of such protection, it is possible that copyright law has veered
off the path the Framers intended in the eighteenth century. One should also
not forget Justice Brennan’s oft-overlooked dissent in the same decision. That
dissent reminds us that “[t]he copyright laws serve as the ‘engine of free
expression’ only when the statutory monopoly does not choke off
multifarious indirect uses and consequent broad dissemination of information
and ideas.”182 In the later Eldred decision, the Court also stated that greater
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First Amendment scrutiny may be necessary when “Congress has . . . altered
the traditional contours of copyright protection.”183
While the discussion of intellectual property and human rights tends
to focus on the tensions and conflicts between these two forms of rights,184
we should not ignore the human rights bases of intellectual property rights.185
In fact, a human rights-based approach could make the copyright system
more author-centric, as opposed to one centering around either the publisher
or the copyrighted work itself.186 As Farida Shaheed, the first U.N. Special
Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, reminded us in her report on
copyright policy and the right to science and culture:
[T]he human right to protection of authorship is non-transferable,
grounded on the concept of human dignity, and may be claimed only
by the human creator, “whether man or woman, individual or group of
individuals”. Even when an author sells their copyright interest to a
corporate publisher or distributer, the right to protection of authorship
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remains with the human author(s) whose creative vision gave
expression to the work.187

If followed, such an author-centric approach would move the U.S. copyright
regime closer to the model found in continental Europe, which protects
authors’ rights (droit d’auteur) rather than copyright. Upon his return in our
imaginary scenario, Marshall would be likely to become intrigued, if not
delighted, by “the process of reformulation along civil law lines.”188
CONCLUSION
This tribute focuses on what would have happened had Marshall been
frozen on his way to academia in 1978 and whether he would find certain
developments surrounding the Berne Convention interesting or surprising
upon his return in 2021. This imaginary scenario, of course, did not happen.
For more than forty years, Marshall has been deeply engaging with many of
the copyright questions explored in this Article. 189 Those who follow his
scholarship also know that he is the noted scholar who wrote the prescient
piece amid the TRIPS negotiations. Even after a quarter of a century of the
WTO, policymakers should take seriously his cautious advice.
Without Marshall’s insights into both domestic and international
copyright law, we would not have understood the Berne Convention as well
as we have today. Many of us who travel with him on the copyright law
journey—or join him in international conferences—have also benefited from
his generous insights, helpful advice, and good companionship. Considering
that Marshall has educated many students from around the world—including
those from mainland China and Taiwan—let me close this tribute by bringing
up the wise words of my favorite philosopher. In Book 2 of the Analects,
Confucius declared: “At thirty, I had planted my feet firm upon the ground.
At forty, I no longer suffered from perplexities. [Sanshi erli / sishi er
buhuo]”190 Having an academic life for more than forty years, Marshall no
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longer suffers from any perplexities in copyright law. That is why we are so
eager to learn from this revered laoshi.
Marshall, congratulations on having a long, rich, and fruitful career.
Thank you for your dedication and tireless work in helping us understand
copyright law—domestic and international alike. I look forward to continuing
our intellectual engagement after the publication of this special issue, and I
cannot wait to see you again in your hometown, Fort Worth.

